After the invasion of Europe
in Normandy during the Second World War, there was another major effort to
attack Germany and end the war sooner, and with less cost of lives. But tragically this invasion failed. Due to bad weather, faulty information and
equipment, and the hurried planning of the offensive, problems were encountered
before the operation even began. At the
end over 1,000 men of the Allied forces were casualties in the final
defeat. This offensive, intended to
spear-head into Germany itself, and so end the war, was called Operation Market
Garden.
The plan was conceived by General Montgomery, commander of the British forces in Europe. The success of the D–Day landings had been slowed down as resistance by the Germans became stiffer as the Allies pressed on to Berlin. One example was a major battle of conflicting forces near Falaise, France, which did succeed, but with a cost. However, the Allies had managed to liberate Paris and Brussels, and victory was apparently close. General Montgomery thought that a narrow spear-like thrust, driving deep into Germany, would have more effect than a spread out attack across the whole Western Front. The plan’s name, ‘Market Garden’ was a combination of the two operations that would work together to drive deep into Germany: ‘Market’ stood for the airborne elements – paratroopers, gliders, and supply planes; ‘Garden’ stood for the ground forces: XXX Corps (Thirty Corps), who would advance along the road through Eindhoven and Nijmegen to Arnhem, which was the final objective.
“Market Garden was one
of the boldest plans of World War Two. Thirty thousand British and American
airborne troops were to be flown behind enemy lines to capture the eight
bridges that spanned the network of canals and rivers on the Dutch/German
border. At the same time, British tanks
and infantry were to push up a narrow road leading from the Allied front line
to these key bridges. They would relieve the airborne troops, and then cross
the intact bridges.” (1)
The airborne invasion of
Normandy, on the night prior to D–Day, had given substantial foundation to the
idea of airborne troops capturing objectives ahead of the main army and holding
them until reinforced. This idea was the
foundation behind Operation Market Garden, which was to begin on 17 September,
1944. Seven days before the operation
was to go ahead, General Browning was told about the objectives with orders to
prepare the offensive.
“The information he was
given on the German troops in the area, however, was alarming. It suggested
that there were two SS Panzer divisions around Arnhem, with many tanks and
vehicles. Major Tony Hibbert recalls the bleak assessment of aerial photographs
made by General Browning's intelligence officer, Major Brian Urquhart:
‘He showed me photographs of two German
Panzer 4 divisions; mainly I think they were tucked in underneath woods. I went to General Browning, and said that, because of the presence of these two
divisions, in his view the operation
could not succeed’. (emphasis
added)”(2)
General Browning ignored
this important information and sent Major Urquhart home on sick leave, thinking
that his mind was overstressed.
Another major fact was ignored as well. The glider-borne troops were given
field-radios to be able to contact the other airborne divisions and XXX Corps
as they came along. But the problem with
the radios that were supplied to the airborne element was that they only had a
range of three or five miles. Arnhem was
over fifteen miles from the divisional head-quarters in Nijmegen and eight miles from the bridges. The airborne troops had complained
vociferously about the inadequacy of the radios, ever since the Normandy
invasion, in fact – but their pleas for capable radio-sets went unheard.
Browning planned for the
three divisions of American and British paratroopers to land close to the Dutch
towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, capturing intact the eight
bridges. But there were not enough
aircraft to take them all over at once.
Therefore, he decided to have them dropped over the course of three
days, because, according to the army co-operation staff, the pilots would be
too tired after the first flight to make another. Also, at Arnhem the anti-aircraft defences
were thought to be too strong for landing right at the bridge, so the soldiers
were to be landed seven miles away
outside the town. This would, of course,
throw away any chance they had for surprise.
One of the air staff who helped plan the ‘Market’ side of the plan said
this:
“The air-plan was bad. All experience and common sense pointed to
landing all three divisions in the minimum amount of time so they could collect
themselves before the Germans reacted . . . but the First Allied Airborne Army
insisted on a plan which had the second wave of troops (with half the heavy
equipment) arriving more than twenty-four hours after the German had been
alerted.”(3)
“The planners called the [above plan] an
'airborne carpet', along which the advancing British armour of XXX Corps could
push through to Germany.” XXX Corps was put onto a very tight
schedule: they were supposed to advance
25 miles a day through enemy occupied territory, ousting the opposition, and
reinforcing the airborne troops within three days from the beginning of the
attack. They only managed to cover seven
miles in the first day – at the cost of at least a score of tanks, jeeps, and
personnel carriers. The German
resistance was stiffer than had been expected:
“XXX Corps had found it difficult to gain
any momentum from the outset, and the destruction of the bridge at Son slowed
them even further. German pressure on the highway increased as the days passed,
undeterred by the British flanking corps, which was struggling to make
progress.”
Some groups of both
airborne troops and ground infantry made it to their objectives, the bridges, –
only to have them destroyed right under their noses. Then they would spend thirty-six hours repairing
the bridge before moving on again, during which time however, the Germans had
mustered up even more formidable oppositions.
By the time XXX Corps
managed to reach Nijmegen, the American contingent tasked with hold the bridge
was only just fending off attacks on the south side of the bridge. It was now the third day, according the
‘proper’ schedule the Corps was two days behind time. Suffice it to say that after a terribly
costly river crossing and landing on the fourth day, Nijmegen and its bridge were
finally in the hands of the Allies – who then stopped. Tired out from four days of continuous
fighting XXX Corps needed a rest to recruit their strength. This proved to have deadly results for the
small group of British paratrooper holding the Arnhem bridge against heavy
German armour.
Since the intelligence
was correct about the two German divisions at Arnhem, how could a small group
of lightly armed British paratroopers capture the two bridges there without
serious casualties? More importantly, why would an undersized attacking force
be landed farther away from the objective, eliminating the important element of
surprise? It would, in the long run, be
better for the attacking force to suffer slightly more immediate casualties in
a surprise landing right at the foot of the bridge than have to slowly fight
their way for seven miles across enemy territory to their goal. What was the problem with transport pilots
doing even two flights a day? Some
pilots did four or more flights on D–Day; and the infantry would then have been
at least double the force that actually made it to the bridges – doubling the
chance of success.
Why were the airborne
troops not given better quality radio-sets?
That at least would have prevented almost all of the communication
problems that happened during the operation.
Why did XXX Corps have to be on such a tight schedule with no room for
problems? That relates to the next
question: Why did the three airborne divisions have to take so many bridges at
once? If the airborne element had not
been tasked with so many bridges so far away, XXX Corps would have had more
time for setbacks. This would have meant
a larger force for a shorter time at each bridge to enable the ‘airborne
carpet’ to comfortably wait for XXX Corps.
The above and many other
questions can be and have been asked: but we shall never know for certain all
the answers. General Montgomery wrote
this:
“The uncertainty of the weather
and of whether the German forces were actually able to resist the British
attack, we all accepted. It could only
have been offset, and the operation made a certainty, by allotting additional
resources to the project . . . I must admit a bad mistake on my part – I
under-estimated the difficulties: I was wrong.”(6)
There are differing opinions about the effect and
success, or lack thereof, of Operation Market Garden. Even more diverse are the ideas and
suggestions of what might have been done to prevent the terrible mistakes that
unnecessarily cost one thousand Allied soldiers their lives. For example, the operation could have been
practiced, if not on a full scale trial, but at least tested like the D–Day
assault was months before it was to go ahead.
That would at least have found out the deficiency in the range of the
radios, preventing the communication problems, and probably enabling the
‘airborne carpet’ to maintain contact with the other forces. If conditions in the weather, German
opposition, and the state of equipment in the Allied forces had been better
thought out, and more completely provided for, Operation Market Garden likely
would have seen success. But the
combination of bad planning and worse weather contributed to the ultimate
withdrawal of the British and American forces.
Many courageous actions were fought during the nine day
campaign; many objectives were captured and held; the withdrawal of two
thousand troops from enemy territory was amazing and many difficulties not
expected were overcome. But in the end:
“There is no doubt that Operation Market
Garden failed. No matter how close XXX Corps got to Arnhem, the British Second
Army did not cross its bridge over the Rhine, and the war in Europe continued
into 1945. Operation Market Garden
accomplished much of what it had been designed to accomplish. Nevertheless, by
the merciless logic of war, Market Garden was a failure.”(
We shall never know for
sure what might have happened if things had taken a turn for the better. What we do
know for certain, however, is that ‘Market Garden’ was, to all involved, both
fighting and observing, truly a bridge too far.
Written by William Moore